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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
EARL ALLEN v. STEPHEN L. HARDY

ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-6593.

Decided June-, 1986

PER CURIAM.

In 1978, petitioner Earl Allen, a black man: was indicted
for murdering his girlfriend and her brother. During selection of the petit jurors at petitioner's trial. the prosecutor
exercised 9 of the State's 17 peremptory challenges to strike
7 black and 2 Hispanic veniremen. Defense counsel moved
to discharge the jury on the ground that the "'State's use of
peremptory challenges undercut [petitioner's] right to an impartial jury selected from a cross-section of the community
by systematically excluding minorities from the petit jury.· "
People v. Allen . 96 Ill. App. 3d 871, 875, 422 N. E. 2d 100.
104 (1981). The trial judge denied the motion. The jury
convicted petitioner on both counts, and the judge sentenced
him to two concurrent prison terms of from 100 to 300 years.
On appeal, petitioner repeated his argument concerning
the State's exercise of peremptory challenges. Relying on
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965). and on Illinois case
law decided under Swain. the Illinois Appellate Court rejected the argument. The court reasoned that in the absence of a showing that prosecutors in the jurisdiction systematically were using their challenges to strike members of
a particular racial group, "a prosecutor's motives may not be
inquired into when he excludes members of that group from
sitting on a particular case by the use of peremptory challenges." 96 Ill. App. 3d, at 875. 422 N. E . 2d. at 104. The
record in this case did not establish systematic exclusion as
required by Swain. /d., at 876, 422 N. E. 2d, at 10·t The
court therefore affirmed petitioner's convictions. ld., at
880, 422 N. E. 2d, at 107.
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Pl•titioner then fill•d a t>t:tillon for federal habeag corpus relief in the Distr·ict Court for the Northem District of Illinois,
on which he renewed his argument concerning the State's use
of peremptory challenges. Com•truing this argument as alleging only that pro~ccutor~ in the jurisdiction systematically
excluded minoritiel:> n·om juries, the District Court denied petitioner's motion for discovery to support the claim, and denied relief. Petitioner's failure at trial "to make even an
offer of proof" to satisfy the evidentiary standard of Swain
constituted a procedural default for which petitioner had offered no excuse. 577 F. Supp. 984, 986 (ND Ill. 1984); see
583 F. Supp. 562 (ND Ill. 1984). In a subsequent opinion,
the District Court also considered and rejected petitioner's
contention that the State's exercise of its peremptory challenges at his trial violated the Sixth Amendment. 586 F.
Supp. 103, 104-106 (1984). Moreover, noting that the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had "twice within the past
60 days reconfinned the continuing validity of Swain,'' the
decision on which the orders in this case rested, the District
Court declined to issue a certificate of probable cause.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. which the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit construed as an application for a
certificate of probable cause to appeal. Finding that petitioner failed to make a "substantial showing of the denial
of a federal right'' or that the questions he sought to raise
"deserve[d) further proceedings," the court denied the request for a certificate of probable cause.
In his petition for certiorari. petitioner argues that the
Court of Appeals' refusal to issue a certificate of probable
cause was erroneous in view of the fact that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. - - (1986), was pending before us at the
time of the Court of Appeals' decision. The thrust of petitioner's argument(;) is that the rule in Batson should be available to him as a ground for relief on remand. We conclude
that our decision in Batsou should not be applied retroac-
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tively on collateral re\;ew of com;ctions that became final before our opinion was announced , and we therefore affirm. '
In deciding the extent to which a decision announcing a
new co~titutionaJ rule of crimina] procedure should be given
retroactive effect, the Court traditionally has weighed three
factors. They are "'(a) the purpose to be served by the new
standards, (b) the extent of the reliance bv law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and c • the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards.'" Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638. 643 (1984)
(quoting Stovall v. De1u'.o. 388 t:. S. 293. 297 (1967)): see
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 t:. S. 618. 636 (19651. Wbile a decision on retroacti\ity requires careful consideration of all
three criteria, the Court has held that a decision announcing
a new standard ''is almost automatically nonretroactive"
where the decision "has e>.:plicitly overruled past precedent ..,
Solem v. Stumes, supra. ~at 646, &H. The nile in
Batson \'. Kentucky is an explicit and substantial break \\ith
prior precedent. In Su:ain v. Alabama, the Court held that.
although the use of peremptory challenges to strike black jur ors on account of race \iolated the Equal Protection Clause.
a defendant could not establish such a violation solely on
proof of the prosecutor's action at his 0'-'11 trial. 380 l". S..
at 220- 226. Batson overruled that portion of SU'ain. changing the standard for proving unconstitutional abuse of peremptory challenges. Against that background. we consider
whether the standard announced in Batson should be available on habeas re\iew of petitioner's murder convictions.
The first factor concerns the purpose to be served by the
new rule. Retroactive effect is "appropriate where a new
constitutional pr inciple is designed to enhance the accuracy of
criminal trials~· Solem v. Stumes. supra. at 643. but the
r

'"By final we mean where the judgment of conviction Wa.E rendered. the
availability of appeal exhausted. and the time for petition for certiorari had
elapsed before our decision in'' Batson \'. Kentucky. Linkletter v. Walker.
381 U. S. 618, 622, n. 5 (1965).
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fact that a rule may have some impact on the accuracy of a
trial does not compel a finding of retroactivity. /d., at
643-645. Instead, the purpose to be served by the new
standard weighs in favor of retroactivity where the standard
"goes to the heart of the truthfinding function." I d., at 645.
By serving a criminal defendant's interest in neutral jury selection procedures, the rule in Batson plainly has some bearing on the truthfinding function of a criminal trial. But the
decision serves other values as well. Our holding ensures
that States do not discriminate against citizens who are summoned to sit in judgment against a member of their own race
and strengthens public confidence in the administration of
justice. The rule in Batson, therefore, was designed "to
serve multiple ends," only the first of which has some impact
on truthfinding. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 323,
329 (1980); see also Tehan v. United States ex rei. Shott, 382
U. S. 406, 414 (1966). Significantly, the new rule joins other
procedures that protect a defendant's interest in a neutral
factfinder. 2 Those other mechanisms existed prior to our
decision in Batson, creating a high probability that the individual jurors seated in a particular case were free from bias.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the new rule has such a fundamental impact on the integrity of factfinding as to compel
retroactive application.
Moreover, the factors concerning reliance on the old rule
and the effect of retroactive application on the administration
of justice weigh heavily in favor of nonretroactive effect. As
noted above, Batson not only overruled the evidentiary
standard of Swain, it also announced a new standard that significantly changes the burden of proof imposed on both defendant and prosecutor. There is no question that prosecu:Voir dire examination is designed to identify veniremen who are
biased so that those persons may be excused through challenges for cause.
Moreover, the jury charge typically includes instructions emphasizing that
the jurors must not rest their decision on any impermissible factor. such as
passion or prejudice.
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tors, trial judges, and appellate courts throughout our state
and federal systems justifiably have relied on the standard of
Swain. 3 Indeed, the decisions of the Illinois Appellate
Court affirming petitioner's convictions and of the District
Court denying habeas corpus relief clearly illustrate the reliance lower courts placed on Swain. Under these circumstances, the reliance interest of law enforcement officials is
"compelling" and supports a decision that the new rule should
not be retroactive. Solem v. Stwn.es, supra, at 650.
Similarly, retroactive application of the Batson rule on collateral review of final convictions would seriously disrupt the
administration of justice. Retroactive application would require trial courts to hold hearings, often years after the conviction became final, to determine whether the defendant's
proof concerning the prosecutor's exercise of challenges established ~prima facie case of discrimination. Where a
defendant made out a prima facie case, the court then would
be required to ask the prosecutor to explain his reasons for
the challenges, a task that would be impossible in virtually
every case since the prosecutor, relying on Swain, would
have had no reason to think such an explanation would someday be necessary. Many final convictions therefore would be
vacated, with retrial "hampered by problems of lost evidence, faulty memory, and missing witnesses." Solem v.
Stumes, supra, at 650; see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U. S., at 637.
Our weighing of the pertinent criteria compels the conclusion that the rule in Batson should not be available to petitioner on federal habeas corpus review of his convictions.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.~

Affinned.
The substantial reliance by lower courts on the standard in S1~·ain has
been fully documented elsewhere. See Batsou v. Kentucky, 476 U. S.
- , - . n. 1 (1986); McCray v. Abrams, 750 f. 2d 1113, 1120, n. 2 (CA2
1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1426.
~In his petition for certiorari, petitioner also argues that the District
3
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Court erroneously denied him discovery on his claim that prosecutors systematically had excluded minorities from petit juries in the jurisdiction.
In effect. the District Court held that, by making no offer of proof on this
claim, petitioner's bare objection failed to preserve the claim for review.
Since petitioner points to no Illinois authority casting doubt on the District
Court's conclusion that, at the least, an offer of proof was necessary to preserve the issue, we have no reason to question the District Court's conclusion that the claim was waived. Similarly, the District Court properly determined that petitioner was required to, and did not, establish cause and
prejudice excusing his default. See Wainwright v. Sykes. 433 U. S. 72
(1977).

